Bar and restaurant revenues, non-smoking ordinances, health care legislation. 
Introduction
Non-smoking ordinances for public spaces in general and bars and restaurants in particular are among the most frequently applied and controversially discussed public health initiatives worldwide. The rationale on which these ordinances has been built is straightforward -they aim at reducing the exposure of non-smokers to secondhand smoke and, hence, their susceptibility to respiratory and heart diseases, and ultimately a reduction in health care costs. This argument applies to bar and restaurant visitors and particularly to employees, who might be less free in choice than customers or patrons. Furthermore, the empirical literature suggests smoking bans to reduce the overall consumption of tobacco products (Pakko 2006a) , which cause significant social costs estimated at 0.1 %-1.1 % of GDP (Lightwood 2000) . In contrast to increasing taxation of tobacco products, the impact of smoking bans cannot be neutralized by an increase in smuggling of tobacco products. In terms of traditional welfare economics, this argument is sometimes questioned since, in principle, and given the respective demand from non-smokers, markets should be able to provide smoke-free spaces in bars and restaurants without the intervention of the state. Critics of non-smoking ordinances argue that undesirable loss of choice will result in reduced bar and restaurant revenues. This criticism implies the assumption that the decrease in expenditure of smokers would be greater than the increase in expenditure of non-smokers. However, this is a purely empirical issue and can hardly be affirmed on the basis of existing empirical evidence concentrated on the U. S.
Effectively, only few of the newer studies reveal a significantly negative impact of nonsmoking ordinance on bar and restaurant revenues, 1 among these Pakko (2007) and Cowling and Bond (2005) for California (USA) and Evans (2005) for Canada. Most studies instead point to insignificant impacts, e. g. Blecher (2006) for South-Africa, Dai et al. (2004) for Florida (USA), Edwards et al. (2008) for New-Zeeland or Parker and Chiang (2007) for California (USA) while others do not find any significant impact at all. 2 The literature is dominated by analyses based on multivariate regressions and official statistics, although some studies employ ARIMA-models (e. g. Stolzenberg/DÁ lessio 2007) and make use of survey data (Adda et al. 2007; Dunham/Marlow 2000 , 2003 . Besides the effects of smoking-bans on bar and restaurant revenues, the literature has also considered employment data (Adams/Cotti 2007 , Alpert et al. 2007 , Thompson et al. 2008) and less common indicators that include purchasing prices of restaurants (Alamar/ Glantz 2004 ) tourism demand (Glantz/Charlesworth 1999) or non-economic indicators like air quality (Alpert et al. 2007 ). Scollo and Lal (2008) provide an extensive survey on these strands of research.
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To our knowledge, this study is the first multivariate empirical analysis of the economic impact of a non-smoking ordinance in Europe. We further extend the literature on the impact of (non-)smoking ordinances on bar and restaurant revenues by providing new evidence based on a) the German smoke-free bar and restaurant ordinance implemented by German Federal States between autumn 2007 and the beginning of 2008 and b) exemptions to a general smoking-ban introduced by the Federal States following a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) between August 2008 and 2009. In addition to an established panel approach, which we extend to distinguish between short-run and intermediate effects, we exploit the fact that the new legislation as well as the subsequent exemptions were introduced by federal states at different dates. This particularity facilitates the first application of a quasi-experimental difference-in-difference (DD) strategy in the realm of the smoking ban literature, allowing for a more efficient control for macroeconomic conditions compared to previous studies. In a recent working paper, Anger et al. (2010) , apply a difference-in-difference approach to individual data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study to identify the impact of the public smoking bans on individual smoking behavior. While they do not find evidence for a change in average smoking behavior within the population, they do find considerable heterogeneity in the effects for several population groups. Non-smoking laws primarily impose a smoking ban on restaurants, but do allow for the set-up of separate "smoking rooms''. Only Bavaria banned smoking from restaurants without any exceptions whatsoever. In Saarland, and in Saxony since 1 March 2008, smoking is permitted not only in smoking rooms, but also in owner-operated restaurants without employees. Discothèques, defined as restaurants (Gaststä tten) under section 1 of the German Restaurants Act (GastG), are also subject to the smoking ban. In the states Baden-Wü rttemberg, Brandenburg, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, however, smoking rooms are not permitted. Bavaria's smoking ban in this context does not allow for any exceptions. Party tents or marquees are exempt from the smoking ban in some states.
In its decision on 30 July 2008, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) found, regarding constitutional challenges brought against the smoking bans in Baden-Wü rttemberg and Berlin by operators of restaurants and discothèques, that the state regulations violated the complainants' fundamental right to pursue a trade under Art. 12 I GG (German Basic Law). Furthermore, the court found that it violated the principle of equality under Art. 3 GG if licensed smoking rooms in restaurants were banned from discothè-ques (cf. BVerfG, 1 BvR 3262/07 dated 30 July 2008).
However, the decision did not void these regulations. Instead, they continued to remain in force until constitutionals revision of the regulations -which had to completed by 31 December 2009 -with the proviso that restaurants shall be exempted that do not have smoking rooms; that do not serve prepared food; that have a guest area of less than 75 sq. m.; that do not admit persons under the age of 18; and that are classified as a "smoking restaurant''. In addition, smoking rooms shall be permitted in discothèques if such rooms are also permitted in restaurants (cf. Table A1 (see appendix).
Empirical analyses 3.1 Data
We investigate the impact of German non-smoking ordinances on bar and restaurant revenues using a monthly panel for German Federal States ranging from January, 2005 to December, 2009. Our data set stems from a special evaluation of the German Federal Statistical Office based on their monthly survey in the hospitality sector (Monatserhebung im Gastgewerbe). The survey is based on a random sample of businesses with annual revenues exceeding Q 50,000, covering 8 % of all businesses (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008a: 6). The special evaluation provides indices of real revenues (reale Umsatzmesszahlen) for the industrial sectors 56.1 and 56.3 according to the WZ2008 / NACE Rev. 2 industrial classification scheme, encompassing revenues of bars (including discos und dancing halls) (56.3) and restaurants (including cafes, ice cream parlors and snack bars) (56.1). While data were available for the whole hospitality sector, too (56), these remain unconsidered in the present analysis since they include caterer and other services that presumably are not directly affected by smoking-ban legislations. The statistical office could not provide indices for bar revenues and only restaurant revenue indices starting in January 2008 for the Federal States Berlin and Brandenburg due to their underrepresentation in the underlying survey so that both states had to remain unconsidered in the present analysis. Furthermore, indices for the Federal States Lower Saxony and North-Rhine Westphalia are missing for 2005. This leaves us with 36 observations for each of the two states and 48 observations for the 12 remaining states and, hence, a total sample of 816 observations for 14 federal states (excluding Berlin and Brandenburg). While we use all available data in our benchmark regressions, unpublished robustness checks for a reduced balanced panel from January 2006 to December 2009 produce virtually identical results. Data on the proportion of unemployed at the total civilian labor force were taken from the labor statistics of the Federal Employment Agency. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A2 in the appendix. Nonstationarity was easily rejected for all variables based on standard panel unit-root tests (Levin et al. 2002) .
Panel analysis
Throughout our empirical analyses we investigate the evolution of the revenue indices (UMZ) for bars and restaurants at the levels of months (t) and German Federal States (i). Data are analyzed within a panel framework that allows for unobserved time-invariant effects at the state level (f i ). As a control for macroeconomic conditions, which affect income levels and willingness to spend money in bars or restaurants, we add the rate of unemployment (U it ). Potential seasonality is accounted for by a set of monthly dummy variables (m n ). Furthermore, we allow for heterogeneity in linear long-term (monthly) trends at the state level (TREND i ) to capture unobserved state specific particularities that affect the long-run consumption behavior. The variables of interest, finally, test for a significant percentage impact on the revenues of the smoking ban legislation as well as the subsequently introduced exemptions. Our final specification, allowing for level and trend shifts, reads as follows:
where BAN it is a dummy variable indicating whenever a smoking ban was in operation in state i in month t; BTREND it is a (monthly) trend variable that takes a value of 1 at the month the smoking ban was put into operation in state i. WBAN it similarly is a dummy variable indicating whenever a considerable exceptions to a general smoking ban had been introduced and WTREND it is the respective trend taking a value of 1 for the months when exemptions were introduced. Greek letters denote parameters with the exception of e it which is a random error term component. Serial autorcorrelation, which we detected using the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for serial correlation in a fixed effects model (Baltagi 2001 : 94 f.) is addressed by clustering standard errors at the state level (Bertrand 2004) . In the present specification, the percentage impact on revenues in the first month of a smoking ban (exemption) being in operation can be inferred from coefficient a 1 (b 1 ). 5 In contrast, a 2 (b 2 ) is the monthly percentage change in revenues after the first month of operation, conditional on other factors, and can indicate either an effect of recovery, amplification or persistency. Note that our specification tests for a significant impact of exemptions to the general smoking ban, conditional on that a ban had already been introduced. The cumulative (relative) level and trend effects therefore correspond to the sum of a 1 and a 2 and b 1 and b 2 , respectively. We test a number of alterations to specification (1) using either revenue indices for bars (Table 1) or restaurants (Table 2) as a dependent variable. At the first stage of the empirical analysis we consider a reduced model specification where only the effects of the introduction of a smoking-ban are considered. We test for significant level shifts in revenues between the periods prior to and after implementation of a smoking-ban (columns 1) or for shifts in level and trends (columns 2), while holding the underlying long-run trends constant for all Federal States. Columns (3) alters column (2) specification in that we allow for individual trends at the state level. Columns (4-6) repeat columns (1-3) specifications while considering the exemptions to the general bans following the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) as a second treatment. Overall, results provide limited support for significant effects of the non-smoking legislation on bar and restaurant revenues. There are no significant changes in mean revenues after bans or exemptions were introduced. However, there is some weak evidence for negative impact on bar and in particular restaurant revenues, once a trend shift is allowed for (Table 1, column 5; Table 2 , columns 2-3 and 5-6). Notably, the respective point estimates are close to a borderline significance level. Given the positive (relative) post-intervention (BAN Â BTREND) trend coefficients (only significant in Table 2 , column 3), these results could be read as indicative for a negative short term effect, followed by a recovery. These effects, however, are rendered insignificant in our preferred specifications where individual trends are allowed for states (columns 3 and 6). These results confirm Fleck and Hanssen (2008) , who argue that it is crucial to control appropriately for individual trends in order to precisely assess the intervention effect of smoking bans and to avoid spurious evidence. Finally, we note that rate of unemployment shows the expected negative sign throughout Tables 1 and 2 although only significant at conventional levels in the latter.
Difference-in-difference analysis
As presented in more detail in Table A1 Figure A1 in the appendix, shows the evolution of mean revenue indices during the introduction period for states, which at a given date had or had not introduced smoking ban legislations. Despite the composition of the two groups changes over the introduction period, the evolution of the indices is relatively similar, indicating that all states followed the same macro-economic trends.
In the second part of our analysis we employ a difference-in-difference (DD) approach to estimate our coefficients of interest, i. e. a 1 , a 2 , b 1 and b 2 . The DD specification is derived from specification (1), substituting the set of 11 dummy variables (m n ) denoting the months February to December by a full set of monthly time effects d t , each representing a single month of the observation period. These time effects entirely capture all common macroeconomic shocks to the study area so that our treatment measures only exploit the remaining variation in revenues within affected states relative to the states where no intervention takes place. In addition, we take first differences so that unobserved fixed effects (f i ) are differentiated out. Note that DTREND in first-differences corresponds to a standard set of state fixed effects. While common conditions are captured by time effects, the rate of unemployment provides a further control for permanent shocks at the state level.
Besides adjusting flexibly to macroeconomic conditions, an essential feature for the specification compared to a standard DD approach is that the intervention can occur at different points in time within different states. 6 All treatment coefficients (s k ={a 1 , b 2 }) provide DD estimates in the sense that they differentiate the revenue indices both between groups (affected / TREAT and not-affected / CONTROL by smoking legislation) and time (prior / PRE to and after / POST the intervention).
Estimates according to specification (2) are provided in Table 3 (bar revenues) and Table  4 (restaurant revenues). Given that most of the states had introduced their legislations by February 2008, we conduct our analyses both an on the full study period (columns 4-6) as well as on a reduced study period that ends in January 2008, so to make sure to have a large number of states in the control group (columns 1-3). Similar to the sub-section above, we conduct a series of estimates in each case. We first omit state effects, which serve as a control for individual trends, the rate of unemployment and the trend shifter to obtain a standard unconditional DD estimate on a significant level shift in revenues after an introduction of a smoking-ban legislation (column 1). In column (2) we control for state unemployment rates and state trends while column (3), in addition, facilitates a shift in the (relative) trend after an intervention took place. In columns (4-6), the respective estimates for the full specification and sample are presented.
Our results do not support the existence of significant effects of the smoking-ban legislation on bar and restaurant revenues as none of the coefficients of interest satisfy conventional significance criteria. The negative level shift parameters (on BAN) are reduced remarkably, in particular in the case of hospitality revenues. Notably, the results exhibit a high degree of parameter stability, indicating the robustness of the findings and a relatively higher reliability compared to the results from the standard panel approach. While all coefficient estimates for our treatment variables are very close to zero in Table 4 , the point estimates in Table 3 consistently indicate an about 3 % reduction in bar revenues Notes: Endogenous variable is log of revenue index (UMZ) in all models. Standard errors are robust for heteroscasticity and clustered at the state (Bundeslä nder) level. + / * / ** denote significance at the 10 / 5 / 1 percent level.
following the introduction of smoking ban ordinances. This is notable as this point estimate is in line with the effects revealed by descriptive evidence in an analysis by the German Statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008b). We emphasize, however, that our results do not allow rejecting the hypothesis of no significant impact.
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Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of the German smoking ban legislation on revenues of bars and restaurants. In addition to an established panel regression approach, we employ a quasi-experimental DD research design to analyze the effects of the introduction of general smoking-bans as well as their subsequent weakening on bar and restaurant revenues. Based on our empirical results, we cannot affirm a negative impact on revenues of either bar or restaurants, neither for the introduction nor the weakening of smoking-ban legislations in Germany. Point estimates confirm the 3 % percent reduction in bar revenues in states that introduced smoking bans compared those that did not found in a recent study conducted by the German Statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008b). The point estimate, however, cannot be rejected statistically from being zero. 7 Comparing the reduction in revenues in the third quarter of 2007 to that of the previous year, the statistical office finds a 9.8 % reduction in states which introduced smoking bans compared to a 6.8 % reduction in states without smoking-ban legislation. 8 In a closely related discussion paper that was published after the first version of this paper, Kvasnicka and Tauchmann (2010) -on the basis of a data set ranging from January 2007 to September 2008 -find some evidence for a significantly negative effect. We note that in an earlier version of this paper (Ahlfeldt/Maennig 2009), we found similar results using the same data set as Kvasnicka and Tauchmann (2010) , which, however, did not prove robust as we extended the length of our time series. More generally, our results suggest the importance of controlling not only for unobserved time-invariant state effects, but also for heterogeneity in the long run-trends at the state level to avoid spurious evidence when estimating the intervention effect of a smoking ban. Moreover, the DD research design exploiting explicitly the timing of the introduction and weakening of smoking-bans in different Federal states produces more stable and reliable estimates than the standard panel econometrics framework.
It is important to note that based on our results we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no revenue effects of the smoking bans. We cannot affirm the absence of effects related to the new legislation in statistical terms. The net-effects, however, if existent, seem to be small in comparison to other forces at work. One explanation might be that reduced spending by smokers was compensated for by a corresponding increase by non-smokers.
In any case, we cannot affirm that the German -or similar -legislations, which aim at reducing health care cost, among other things, come at the expense of a risk to businesses in the hospitality sector. 
